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**SUMMARY****SOUTHEAST ASIA**

3. Cambodian internal security situation worsens (page 4).

**EASTERN EUROPE**

4. Ambassador Riddleberger believes conference may have widened gap between Yugoslavia and USSR (page 6).  
5. Western experts comment on implications of Soviet-Tito talks (page 6).  
6. Soviet moves raise hopes among Satellite people for improved domestic situation (page 7).

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
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### SOUTHEAST ASIA

#### 3. Cambodian internal security situation worsens:

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Ambassador McClintock in Phnom Penh expresses concern over the worsening of the internal security situation in Cambodia during recent weeks. Royal councilor

Penn Nouth has confirmed reports of a large rise in banditry and admitted that deserters from the army were partly responsible.

According to the French high commissioner, the increase in army desertions has been caused by the extortion practiced by army officers, who lately have increased the amount of personal "squeeze" they exact from troop pay.

Comment: Brigandage has been most prevalent in western Cambodia, where small roving groups of professional outlaws have made many routes unsafe for travel. Provincial officials reportedly have received little help from the central government in combating these bands.

Members of the former rebel groups which were integrated into the royal army after the Geneva cease-fire have been dissatisfied at receiving lower pay than the regular troops and have deserted. 

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## EASTERN EUROPE

4. Ambassador Riddleberger believes conference may have widened gap between Yugoslavia and USSR:

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[REDACTED] Ambassador Riddleberger believes that the atmosphere of the Soviet-Yugoslav conference may have widened rather than narrowed the gap between the two countries. Riddleberger has learned from good sources that Tito, who had been optimistic about the visit, was clearly disillusioned at the Soviet attitude and not nearly so convinced as formerly of Soviet peaceful intentions.

Tito reportedly was shocked at Soviet boasting that World War I had brought Communism to Russia, World War II had added Eastern Europe and China, and World War III would see it spread throughout the world. He also was reported shaken by frank statements about the continuation of the Stalinist line inside the USSR.

5. Western experts comment on implications of Soviet-Tito talks:

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[REDACTED] Ambassador Bohlen notes that the Belgrade decisions may mark the beginning of Soviet efforts to find some basis for relations with the Satellites other than the Stalinist type of direct control. He believes the USSR may have felt a deal with Tito was an essential step in the process. The ambassador points out that it is probably clear to the men in the Kremlin that any liberalization of relations with the Satellites would be extremely dangerous as long as Yugoslavia maintained a defiant or even distant relationship with the Soviet Union.

Bohlen also states that the Kremlin may have feared that the establishment of Yugoslav-Chinese relations last fall would lead to eventual creation of a rival Communist center which would be influential over Asian neutrals such as India.

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Jean Soutou, French Foreign Ministry expert on Eastern European affairs, sees the courting of Tito as allied with the current Communist united-front tactics in France and Italy.

Comment: Any alteration of the USSR's control mechanism in the Satellites would be designed to encourage popular co-operation with local Communist regimes. Furthermore, such a change at this time might be intended to parry any Western efforts to make the question of Soviet control of the Satellites a subject of four-power negotiations.

6. Soviet moves raise hopes among Satellite people for improved domestic situation:

Recent changes in Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia and Austria have encouraged a mood of "high optimism" among the Hungarian and Rumanian populations over the possibility of a "change" in the domestic Communist regimes. The American legation in Bucharest reports that Soviet prestige has suffered "considerably" and that rumors are widespread that Rumania will be liberated in 1955.

According to the American army attaché in Budapest, reversals in Soviet policies are causing confusion, undermining party discipline, and leading to speculation concerning the possible purge of party leader Rakosi, who took a leading part in the 1948 ouster of Tito from the Cominform. He is said by well-informed sources to be in an "exceedingly agitated state," shouting contradictory orders at meetings of the party leadership and showing signs of overstress and fatigue.

7 June 55

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 7

Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002000520001-1